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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1.1 Flexibility and flexibility needs 
All decarbonisation scenarios point to the increasing electrification of the energy system. Electricity 
will gradually play a bigger role in the transport and building sectors, but in order to reach EU 
climate change targets, the electricity used will need to come increasingly from low carbon sources 
and especially, but not only, from variable renewable energy sources. Both trends, the 
electrification of sectors and the need to integrate electricity from variable renewables, mean that 
there will be a greater need for flexibility in the electricity sector. This need can be met by the 
flexibilisation of both the generation and consumption side and the storage; the more intensive use 
of the existing networks; improved cross-border interconnectivity; and the integration of different 
sectors. The latter might include integrated electricity and gas infrastructure to address seasonal 
storage, heat storage in combination with electrified heating and the utilisation of electric vehicle 
batteries. This Task Force has analysed the complex issue of flexibility and the market framework 
that is best able to provide it. It has identified the following key messages and practical 
recommendations. 
1.2 Key messages and recommendations 
Short-term and balancing markets 
Efficient EU-wide market integration is the principal and most cost-effective source of flexibility. 
The biggest potential remains in the intraday (ID) and balancing markets. The harmonisation of 
market designs is a prerequisite for this integration. The current integration approach attempts to 
build bridges between nationally diverse markets and is limited.  
The existing target model for the intraday timeframe, based on continuous trading, should 
be swiftly implemented. Harmonised intraday auctions in addition to continuous trading (e.g. an 
opening and closing auction) could enable more efficient implicit capacity allocation for cross-
zonal intraday trading. This calls for consultation with market participants and exchanges to work 
out a common plan for all coupled bidding zones.  
Recommendations: 
 The European Commission should work further towards harmonising national short-term 
and balancing market designs. This should be done by ensuring swift implementation of 
existing provisions (e.g. continuous trading in the intraday market) and through further 
provisions towards an efficient target model. Harmonisation should start at the regional 
level, if necessary. 
 The European Commission, member states, power exchanges and transmission system 
operators (TSOs) should continue to pursue pan-European market coupling of day-ahead 
markets, especially connecting with Central and Eastern Europe. 
 To reward flexibility, design elements should include: 
- Balancing energy auctions which are open to pre-qualified market participants and 
which take place after the intraday market 
- Marginal balancing energy and imbalance pricing 
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- Real-time disclosure of the system imbalance and imbalance price allowing for implicit 
balancing by balancing responsible parties 
- EU-wide, harmonised intraday auctions (e.g. opening and closing auctions 
complementary to continuous trade) 
- Long and medium-term balancing capacity auctions only where justified on cost-
efficiency grounds 
- Harmonised trading schedules of the day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets 
including common gate closure times and a common time interval (e.g. 15 minutes) 
- Harmonised basic trading products based on this interval, with subsidiarity on specific 
products 
- Monitoring by ACER and/or a common guideline on balancing market pre-
qualification requirements in order to reduce undue discrimination. 
Grid reinforcement and cross-zonal capacity allocation 
Grid reinforcement has been on the agenda for decades. The European Commission has proposed 
mechanisms for improved capacity allocation and bidding zone revision. Cross-zonal price 
differences (for congested interconnectors) and costs for congestion management (for internally 
congested bidding zones) are indicators for priority needs. There is a trade-off between grid 
reinforcement and alleviating congestion by increasing local flexible generation or consumption 
resources. The core barrier to grid reinforcement is public acceptance by citizens who are affected 
by the construction of new lines.  
Recommendations:  
 The capacity allocation mechanism should be optimised to allocate capacity to the ID and 
balancing markets efficiently, including a market-based price for use of interconnection 
capacity. This may include additional recalculation steps of available capacity after the DA 
and ID markets have closed. 
 In cases where public acceptance hinders new projects, adapting the concerned price zone(s) 
to minimise the cost for congestion management should be considered, taking into account 
past market-based investments. 
 The highest priorities for grid reinforcement (i.e. where cross-zonal price differences and 
costs of congestion management are highest) should receive greater support from ENTSO-
E’s TYNDP and other EU policies (like the Commission-proposed use of congestion rent for 
new investment and the 15% interconnection target for 2030).   
Aggregation 
The role of (and market for) aggregators is bound to grow in the future, with larger 
(industrial/business) participants as first movers. The development will be aided on the one hand 
by removing barriers to market access for interested consumers and on the other by the creation of 
standards and protocols. Based on a level playing field, independent aggregation and aggregation 
carried out by suppliers should both be possible. 
Recommendations: 
 The market design should facilitate the contribution of independent aggregators in a non-
discriminatory way, i.e. removing market barriers (in all time-frames) without introducing 
(indirect) subsidies.  
 EU-level rules should ensure a level playing-field for aggregators. Member state-level rules 
for the calculation of aggregators’ net generation/consumption balance should be monitored 
by ACER. 
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 To enable data exchange and the interoperability of appliances, a common platform, such as 
one based on the CENELEC work, should accelerate the development of common standards 
and protocols.  
Priority dispatch 
Better integrating renewables into the market helps to minimise their impact on flexibility needs. 
Despite their intermittency, solar and wind power can contribute to flexibility and minimise system 
cost. The support schemes on which these energy sources depend can be designed to incentivise 
flexible behaviour. Priority dispatch can be replaced by market-based, non-discriminatory 
curtailment and redispatch rules without harming renewable generators if fair compensation is 
ensured for fallback procedures. However, fallback procedures (whenever market-based 
curtailment fails to solve a grid situation) that do not prioritise renewables may lead to the 
increasing curtailment of renewables, especially in the absence of other policies that incentivise the 
system to adapt for high renewables shares. 
Recommendations:  
 Priority dispatch, should be phased out for new installations, under the condition of non-
discriminatory balancing markets, market-based curtailment and fair compensation of 
fallback (non-market-based) curtailment.  
 A prescriptive EU-level guideline that ensures that the compensation for fallback curtailment 
includes all benefits foregone, differentiating between different generators and customers, 
should be considered. 
 Priority access (a ‘last-curtailed’-rule for renewables when market-based curtailment does 
not solve a grid situation) should be upheld unless other policies facilitate the uptake of high 
renewables shares and flexibilising existing must-run capacities. 
 Emergency (non-market-based) curtailment should be subject to compensation (of benefits 
foregone) for all plants.   
The role of DSOs 
Increasingly decentral generation and flexibility provision puts additional challenges to grid 
operators and particularly to DSOs. They are tasked with integrating a growing number of flexible 
resources, the resulting flows from which need to be coordinated with other stakeholders and 
particularly TSOs. For example, aggregation is different from conventional flexibility because it 
triggers flows in many distributed locations, rather than at a single point in the distribution or 
transmission grid. There are benefits in sharing flexible reserves between both DSOs and TSOs to 
increase system-wide cost-efficiency.  
Recommendations:  
 A mechanism for data exchange between DSOs, TSOs and decentral market participants 
should be developed, to manage resulting electricity flows and enable efficient, system-wide 
use of distributed flexible resources. Such a mechanism should take into account the data 
flows and calculation needs resulting from aggregation. 
 Balancing, congestion management and other ancillary services should be regulated to 
ensure that the required resources are shared efficiently between DSOs and TSOs where 
possible. 
Sectoral integration 
It is undisputed that the market is developing stronger links between the heating/cooling, 
electricity and transport sectors and the different energy carriers used therein (gas/liquid fuel, 
heat, electricity). This sectoral integration has potential benefits for flexibility, decarbonisation and 
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security of supply. Governments may be inclined to pursue specific options and technological 
solutions. This risks creating market distortions. Neglecting the challenges that arise from sectoral 
integration (e.g. seasonal storage for heating) might jeopardise security of supply. 
Recommendations: 
 In order to adapt policies to the effects and needs of sectoral integration, long-term cross-
sectoral energy flows and infrastructure planning (for different scenarios) should be 
institutionalised, starting with electricity, heating and gas infrastructure. 
 The EU and member states should consider integrating cross-sectoral infrastructure 
planning into National Energy and Climate Plans (as part of the proposed Governance 
Regulation) and/or in other institutional frameworks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY AND HOW 
he European Council conclusions of October 2014, pledging to reach at least 27% renewables 
by 2030, and the European Commission’s ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans’ proposals of 
November 2016 will require additional and increasing flexibility in the European power 
system. Reaching 27% renewables by 2030 will translate into a share of at least 45% of renewable 
electricity. By 2050, according to the European Commission’s ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’, renewable 
energy would contribute between 64-96% to the electricity mix.  
Most renewable electricity can be expected to come from intermittent sources (wind and 
solar power). Accommodating such high shares of intermittent renewables will require flexible 
resources – generation and consumption – and infrastructure, as has been continuously 
highlighted by the European Commission. This will include different types of ‘flexibility needs’ for 
different purposes. Matching generation and consumption at every point in time is the most basic 
need. Others include congestion management, voltage control, daily, weekly and seasonal 
flexibility, plus strategic reserves.  
Flexible resources (with varying degrees of flexibility) can include generation (e.g. hydro, 
gas, certain nuclear, renewables, certain coal), consumption (demand response, e.g. power-to-heat, 
interruptible loads, facilitated by digital infrastructure), - as well as electricity storage (e.g. pumped 
storage, batteries and other storage technologies). Infrastructure enabling flexibility can include 
transmission and distribution capacity as well as information and communication technology (ICT, 
e.g. smart meters). 
In a well-functioning market, flexibility has a value. The adequate functioning of electricity 
markets, especially an undistorted market for flexibility, facilitates market-driven investment and 
the efficient utilisation of flexible resources and infrastructure. The European Commission’s aim is 
thus to ensure and if necessary improve the working of the market, notably short-term markets, in 
particular intraday. Balancing and reserve power mechanisms are another focus. 
This CEPS Energy Climate House (ECH) Task Force Report i) takes stock of the market 
regarding flexibility, including the proposals under the Clean Energy for All Europeans package, 
ii) briefly reviews the current and future options, and iii) identifies workable and practical 
proposals for the way forward. An Executive Summary and Recommendations completes the 
Report.  
Annex 1 provides an overview of flexibility technology options. Annex 2 contains a glossary 
of abbreviations and technical terms. Annex 3 lists all Task Force members and speakers.  
T 
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2. FLEXIBILITY OPTIONS 
his chapter introduces the flexibility options that can be addressed by EU policy. They 
include flexible resources, (i.e. flexible generation, consumption and storage technologies), 
options relating to the grid (i.e. grid reinforcement and optimisation of its use) and policy 
options relating to market design and market integration. 
2.1 Flexible resources 
Flexible generation and consumption technologies provide physical flexibility to the electricity 
system. Electricity storage technologies can carry out both functions. For each of the three 
categories, many technology options are capable of providing varying degrees of flexibility.  
A key challenge lies in creating a market and policy framework that enables efficient and 
adequate investment into flexible resources. This is especially important for long-term security of 
supply. On the generation side, both investment in new flexible generation or storage installations 
and in retrofits that render existing installations (like coal or nuclear power plants, but also PV and 
wind power) more flexible, is possible. Developing consumption side flexibility necessitates 
investment into ICT (which enables existing resources) or into storage installations.  
Efficient investments in the electricity sector are helped by long-term price signals.1 These 
price signals are most efficient if they emerge from the market itself. The European electricity 
market currently includes a lack of liquidity in forward markets and a decline of wholesale prices. 
The underlying causes include overcapacity (resulting inter alia from policy-driven additions of 
renewable capacity and reduced consumption), declining fossil-fuel prices, depressed ETS prices 
and market distortions such as exit barriers, price caps and regulated prices. 
The Clean Energy package proposed by the European Commission intends to improve the 
design of the market to improve price signals and enable market-driven investment (also known 
as ‘resource adequacy’).  
Annex 1 includes characterisations of relevant flexible generation and consumption 
technologies. The following sections provide a summary. 
2.1.1 Flexible generation 
Flexible generation technologies can include thermal power plants based on natural gas (turbine 
and combustion engine-based), hydro power, biogas, biomass, coal, nuclear, solar thermal, 
geothermal, but also wind and PV power (with limitations). 
Technologies vary in their degrees of flexibility, typical grid level (centralised vs. 
decentralised), economic potential, limiting conditions and climate-related and environmental 
factors. Typical parameters to characterise an installation’s level of flexibility include minimum 
load (lowest percentage of full load to which it can be throttled), ramp rate (time needed to increase 
or decrease generation output), and start-up-time (duration between cold-start and generation).  
In the future, the levelised cost of electricity by flexible generation sources will be 
significantly impacted by lower full load hours, recurrent partial load operation and a higher 
                                                        
1 F. Genoese, E. Drabik and C. Egenhofer (2016), “The EU power sector needs long-term price signals”. 
T 
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amount of start-stop cycles. This can be expected to impact the profitability of both conventional 
and new generation technologies.2 
While the power sector is probably the most cost-efficient energy sector to reach a carbon-
free state, existing carbon-emitting flexibility assets provide an important trade-off between 
flexibility and emission in the medium term. They might take reserve functions in the long term 
and can technologically transition to low-carbon fuels. 
Many low-carbon (renewable) options depend on support schemes to be competitive and 
operate primarily to reach the decarbonisation objective and only secondarily to provide flexibility. 
This situation might change with further cost reductions of renewable technologies and with better 
market access, e.g. to balancing markets. 
2.1.2 Flexible consumption 
Flexible electricity consumption, also known as demand response, plays a role historically and 
today, but constitutes a considerable unused potential. The aluminium industry is a prominent 
example for existing players in demand response, which are mostly in the industrial sector. 3 A 
large theoretical potential of flexible demand resources in the household, business and industrial 
sectors could be unlocked by further developing the necessities (standardisation of IT 
infrastructure and data exchange, market platform, regulatory framework) for their market 
participation. This could include both implicit demand response, i.e. dynamic pricing schemes for 
end-consumers, and explicit demand response (e.g. direct wholesale market participation or 
through aggregation).  
Reportedly, 29% of total EU electricity consumption (52 GW in capacity) qualifies for 
demand response, technically.4 Most of this potential would consist of small-scale, decentralised 
installations, i.e. in the kW to low MW scale.5 Table 2.1 shows a list of processes with demand 
response potential by sector. 
Table 2.1 Processes with demand response potential 
 
Source: SiaPartners (2014), “Demand Response: A Study of its Potential in Europe”. 
                                                        
2 C. Perez Linkenheil, I. Küchle, T. Kurth and F. Huneke (2017), “Flexibility needs and options for Europe’s 
future electricity system”, study by Energy Brainpool for EUGINE. 
3 Alcoa participate in the ancillary services market. Their aluminium factories in Indiana and New York have 
been integrated with regional grid operators to provide overall 125 MW DR capacity. In the past nine years, 
this capacity could be cleared in the market almost every day. Source: presentation by Álvaro Dorado Baselga, 
Vice President Energy Europe, Alcoa in the second Task Force meeting, 31st May 2017. 
4 SiaPartners (2014), “Demand Response – A Study of its Potential in Europe”. 
5  Reportedly, it is distributed relatively evenly across the three sectors (residential 42%, industrial 31%, 
business 27%).  
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To date, the IT infrastructure necessary for decentralised consumption resources to access the 
market (smart metering) is still not deployed widely. Current and future cost reductions due to 
technological progress and scale effects in IT hardware and digital information exchange will be 
significant factors. As will regulatory frameworks, including the possible future evolution from the 
current aggregator model to decentralised markets or blockchain technology. 
In many ways, flexible consumption relates to sectoral integration as it includes technologies 
such as power-to-heat and power-to-gas/liquid, which are interfaces between the electricity, 
heating and transport sectors. 
Aggregation has an important function as enabler for decentralised consumption flexibility.  
2.1.3 Electricity storage 
Electricity storage can both consume and generate6 electricity flexibly. Alongside pumped-hydro 
storage (see section 2.1.1), which is by far the most widely deployed technology, others are 
emerging. 
According to an IEA report,7 out of 3.4 GW non-hydro storage capacities deployed in 2016, 
53% were battery solutions, with lithium ion batteries contributing much more than other battery 
technologies (lead acid, redox-flow, nickel-cadmium, and sodium-sulphur). Flywheels and 
compressed air energy storage (CAES) contributed 28% and 19% respectively. Most projects were 
launched or coordinated by grid operators, either to meet specific ancillary services needs or as 
demonstration plants, i.e. not based on price signals in wholesale markets.  
Battery electric vehicles hold a potential for flexibility provision. In the Netherlands, an 
operator of electric vehicle charging stations started participating in the balancing market in 
January 2016.8 
2.2 Grid 
2.2.1 Grid reinforcement 
Since the European grids are currently adapted to power plants, many of which will be replaced 
by renewable generation in different geographical locations, the problem of grid congestions can 
be expected to grow, along with the costs for the end-consumer.  
New transmission and distribution infrastructure reduces the need for flexible resources to 
compensate for grid congestions. Moreover, expanding cross-border transmission capacity to 
higher levels is a prerequisite to further integrate European markets, which in turn reduces the 
overall need for flexible resources (see option 1). The practice of redispatch means that a reserve of 
flexible resources is kept idle and can be activated in the event of grid congestion. Another form of 
congestion management is counter-trading, where TSOs procure remedial generation through the 
market.  
2.2.2 Better use of the grid 
There is a potential to achieve higher flexibility by optimising the use of the grid. Firstly, better 
representation of grid constraints in market prices can lead to grid-friendly investment decisions 
in new flexible resources. Secondly, better planning of grid operation, enabled by more and better 
data, can reduce the need for hedging uncertainties by blocking safety margins in the grid and 
keeping flexible resources in reserve (for congestion management). 
                                                        
6 To the extent that energy has been consumed before.  
7 International Energy Agency (2017), “Tracking Clean Energy Progress: 2017”. 
8 The New Motion aggregates 19,000 electric vehicle charging stations, see TenneT (2016), “Market Review 
2016”.  
IMPROVING THE MARKET FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR | 9 
By improving the representation of grid constraints in the market design, price signals can 
better incentivise consumers and generators to act flexibly and to the system’s benefit, both in 
short-term dispatch and long-term investment (including renewables). Locational price signals 
would lead to higher revenues in areas where (structural) congestion leads to local shortage, while 
providing lower revenue in areas with local surplus. A transition to more granular price zones (as 
proposed by the European Commission) would achieve this.9 
Another mechanism with similar effects is a dynamic grid charge which varies over time 
according to the level of stress in the grid. Progress in this area necessitates decentralised IT 
infrastructure (smart metering). The feasibility of this approach is currently being demonstrated in 
France.10  
Better use of the grid can also be achieved by more accurately predicting electricity flows 
through better data availability. Monitoring and planning of grid operation involves production 
and consumption schedules of wholesale market participants on the TSO side, but most 
consumption and decentralised production is based on predictions that are subject to a 
considerable margin of error.11 The complexity of these predictions increases as more and more 
decentralised production units are built. Actual grid flows always diverge from planned flows, 
causing inefficiencies because i) grid capacities must be reduced by a margin of safety and ii) 
transactions that would benefit the system can be omitted because of false assumptions during the 
time of trade.  
Evolving IT infrastructure, computational abilities and big data are key enablers for 
optimising the grid and thereby reducing future flexibility needs. 
2.3 Market 
This section gives an overview of how the market design can address the flexibility challenge, both 
by improving the design of individual markets and by integrating them. 
2.3.1 Cross-border market integration 
Further cross-border integrating of the EU’s electricity markets will reduce the overall volatility of 
consumption and intermittent generation through what is referred to as a ‘geographical smoothing 
effect’. By nature, peaks and troughs in two geographically separate electricity systems are to some 
degree decorellated (i.e. do not always occur at the same time). A peak in one system is often 
balanced out by a trough in the other. The degree of decorellation is affected by differences in the 
(renewable) technology mix as well as weather (including water flow) and consumption patterns 
in the two systems. The higher the degree of decorrelation, the lower the combined system 
volatility and the lower the need for flexible resources.  
In addition, the total capacity of flexible resources necessary to operate the combined system 
is lower (in both relative and absolute terms) than for a single system. Balancing reserves can 
therefore be shared, resulting in significant cost reduction. A study published by Agora 
Energiewende,12 for example, confirms the considerable potential for reducing flexibility needs by 
pan-EU integration, both in terms of annual peaks and troughs (which determine needed reserve 
                                                        
9  An important precondition for investment based on locational price signals is that these price signals 
translate into the forward market, which is an unsolved issue the Commission’s proposal tries to address. 
10 Since August 2017, customers connected to the 20 kV level can opt for a dynamic grid charge. 
11 This includes predicting the output from intermittent renewables (weather forecasts) and demand (based 
on consumption profiles). Moreover, computational capacities limit the resolution of grid modelling and the 
structure of large portions of the grid (particularly on the low voltage level) is merely approximated. 
12 Fraunhofer IWES (2015), “The European Power System in 2030: Flexibility Challenges and Integration 
Benefits. An Analysis with a Focus on the Pentalateral Energy Forum Region”, analysis on behalf of Agora 
Energiewende. 
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capacity) and day-to-day volatilities (which determine total flexible energy needed to be 
dispatched). This potential emerges due to EU territory being geographically, climatically and 
technologically diverse.  
For decades, European countries’ electricity systems have been continuously connected by 
physical interconnection capacities and EU internal market policy. While trade is integrated EU-
wide in the day-ahead timeframe, cross-border pooling of TSO-procured flexibility (various 
reserves, including for balancing and redispatch) is not conclusively implemented and cross-
border intraday trade has not reached its full potential. 
The integration of balancing markets is achieved in three steps. Firstly, imbalance netting 
(combining simultaneous surpluses and shortfalls among TSOs) reduces the need for balancing 
energy to be covered by flexible resources. Secondly, sharing reserves then reduces the need for 
reserve capacity. Lastly, a common market platform for both balancing energy and balancing 
capacity encourages competition and achieves maximum efficiency and social benefit.  
So far, 19 countries, including Norway and Switzerland, participate in the coupled day-
ahead market. Some progress has been reached regarding market coupling of ID markets, 
especially in the Nordic region and within the SWE region. However, utilisation of available cross-
border capacities is low in most cases.13 One way to address this would be full implementation of 
the CACM (Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management) Regulation and the upcoming 
network code on electricity balancing, for example. Cross-border exchanges in the balancing 
market are growing, but remain limited. One key reason that hampers swifter integration is the 
divergence of balancing market design among member states, rendering the markets incompatible 
for closer cooperation. In March 2017, an Electricity Balancing Guideline received a positive vote 
in comitology and should lead to future improvements in cross-border balancing. 
The allocation of cross-border transmission capacity14  to the various market timeframes 
(including balancing by TSOs) is an important parameter for market integration, and one that 
should be improved. The objective is to maximise the value of the interconnector capacity. Short-
term cross-border transactions should be considered to enable efficient cross-border exchange of 
flexibility.  
2.3.2 Changes to adapt market design 
Efficient market design will find market solutions for the dispatch of flexibility, while reducing the 
need for TSO-procured reserves. Ultimately, market design should enable price signals for 
investment in the required flexible resources. 
Many elements can enhance flexibility through efficient market design. This includes shorter 
trading intervals closer to real-time (temporal resolution), optimised price zones or locational 
pricing (geographical resolution), removal or improvement of regulatory price restrictions (price 
caps) and more efficient bidding mechanisms in the intraday market (e.g. opening and closing 
intraday auctions complementary to continuous trading). Market integration will require the 
harmonisation of these parameters. 
The market design should ensure that all market participants capable of providing flexibility 
have access to the market. For example, there is potential for variable generation sources such as 
PV and wind turbines to be operated more flexibly. This means that when their primary resource 
(sun/wind) is available, the operator can decide to operate or not. Curtailment of renewables, i.e. 
a flexible production stop, can, under certain circumstances, be a cost-effective option, including 
when appropriate compensation is ensured. The same is true for the opposite, i.e. intermittent 
renewables acting as a reserve within a certain timeframe where the availability of wind or 
sunshine is reasonably certain. 
                                                        
13 ACER (2016), “ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015 - KEY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS”. 
14 This allocation currently gives priority to day-ahead or earlier transactions. 
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Market design must ensure that the market gives price signals for investment in flexibility. 
This is best achieved in a market that is free of distortion, such as regulated prices, exit barriers, 
price caps and undue subsidies. Such distortions endanger long-term market functioning by 
limiting market participants’ ability to obtain sufficient remuneration from the market. While such 
distortions are not the only factor, they have added to the continuous price decline of European 
wholesale markets in recent years. 
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3. MARKET DESIGN PROPOSALS UNDER THE ‘CLEAN 
ENERGY FOR ALL EUROPEANS’ PACKAGE 
n the proposed revisions for the Electricity Market Regulation15 and Directive,16 the European 
Commission proposes a number of provisions relating to flexibility. Table 3.1 gives an overview 
of the provisions and flexibility options they address. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 explain the concrete 
proposals.  
Table 3.1 Overview of provisions for flexibility options 
Proposal Provisions 
Cross-
border 
market 
integration 
Improved 
Market 
Design 
Grid 
reinforce-
ment 
Better 
Use 
of the 
Grid 
Flexible 
Resource 
(including 
generation, 
consumption 
and storage)s 
Proposed 
Electricity 
Market 
Regulation 
(COM(2016) 
861 final) 
Capacity Mechanism 
rules (A18-24) 
X X   X 
No discrimination in 
network charges (A16) 
    X 
ENTSO-E counterpart 
for DSOs (A49-53) 
   X X 
Re-evaluation of 
bidding zones (A13) 
   X  
Optimised use of 
interconnectors (A14-
15) 
X X  X  
Congestion income for 
investment into new 
interconnectors (A17) 
X  X   
Balancing capacity 
procured by ROCs 
(A32-35) 
X     
Harmonisation of 
balancing market 
design (A5,7) 
X X   X 
Removing price caps in 
the wholesale market 
(A9-10) 
 X   X 
Cross-border 
curtailment and 
redispatch (A12) 
X   X  
                                                        
15 COM(2016) 861 final. 
16 COM(2016) 864 final 
I 
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Proposed 
Electricity 
Market 
Directive 
(COM(2016) 
864 final) 
Right for customers to 
prosume, to a dynamic 
price contract and to 
participate in 
aggregation (A11, 13, 
15, 17) 
    X 
Smart metering 
obligation and 
customer right to smart 
meter (A19-21) 
    X 
Role of DSO as neutral 
market facilitator (A30-
36) 
 X  X X 
 
Many provisions addressing flexible resources (last column) focus on enabling decentralised 
sources. 
Interestingly, grid reinforcement receives little attention in the two analysed proposals and 
the Clean Energy for All Europeans package. Major policies for grid expansion were adopted in 
2009 and are yet to be analysed for effectiveness.  
3.1 Provisions in the proposed Electricity Market Regulation 
Articles 18-24 tighten member states’ freedom to devise capacity mechanisms. Capacity 
mechanisms would only be allowed where a European resource adequacy assessment has 
identified an adequacy concern. The proposal would oblige member states to allow cross-border 
participation (where possible). If adopted, the rules would affect the operation of existing 
mechanisms, potentially leading to necessary reforms for some of them.  
Articles 49-53 propose an ENTSO-E counterpart for DSOs. Tasks would include the 
coordination of grid planning with TSOs and the development of demand response and smart 
grids. The new entity would be involved in drafting relevant new network codes and guidelines, 
similar to the current role of ENTSO-E.  
Article 13 calls for a re-evaluation of bidding zones (or price zones). Bidding zones that 
contain structural congestions (i.e. transmission lines that are congested on a regular basis) would 
be revised by the European Commission based on a bidding zone review procedure 17  and a 
recommendation given by the affected TSOs. 
Articles 14 and 15 provide a number of new rules to optimise the use of cross-border 
interconnectors. This includes a penalty for non-use of committed transmission capacity, pressure 
on TSOs to engage more actively in cross-border redispatch and counter-trading, and improved 
allocation of capacity across timeframes (including balancing). 
Article 17 would tie congestion income to use for the operation of existing interconnectors 
and investment in new ones, based on a new methodology to be developed by ACER. 
Articles 32-35 propose the establishment of regional operational centres (ROCs), which 
would coordinate tasks of regional relevance, including procurement of balancing capacities and 
coordinated capacity calculation for interconnectors. 
Article 4 provides existing and new small-scale renewable generation an exemption from 
balancing responsibility. 
                                                        
17  This procedure is defined in the already adopted regulation on capacity allocation and congestion 
management (COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2015/1222). 
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Article 5 would provide new common rules for balancing market design. Imbalances would 
need to be settled at marginal cost and real-time information on the balancing state and imbalance 
price would need to be published by TSOs. 18  Access to the balancing market for all market 
participants would be enshrined. Moreover, balancing energy auctions would need to be held after 
gate closure in the intraday market. The required balancing capacity would be procured regionally, 
separately for upward and downward capacity and would be contracted for a maximum period of 
one day.  
Article 7 would set a mandatory imbalance settlement period and (minimum) time interval 
for market trading at 15 minutes by January 2025 for all EU member states. 
Articles 9 and 10 would eliminate price limits in the wholesale market unless they represent 
the value of lost load (which is to be defined ex ante for each bidding zone).19 Derogation would 
still be possible20 for two more years. Moreover, if price limits (or value of lost load) are reached, 
they would have to be raised the following day. 
Article 11 provides new limits for the priority dispatch of renewable energy, cogeneration 
and innovative technologies and a foundation. For the two former categories, priority dispatch is 
limited to installations smaller than 500kW.21 Existing installations are exempt. 
Article 12 states that market-based mechanisms have to be applied for curtailment and 
redispatch (including for cross-border transactions) and that compensation mechanisms should be 
put in place when fallback (non-market-based) procedures are used. For grid planning, a limit for 
the maximum amount of renewable energy and cogeneration to be curtailed is set at 5%. 
3.2 Provisions in the proposed Electricity Market Directive 
Articles 13 and 15 would entitle final customers to participate in the market both as generators and 
consumers and to engage with aggregators without the consent of their respective suppliers. 
Article 17 exempts aggregators from compensation to suppliers, but gives member states the 
right to choose whether aggregators must compensate suppliers specifically for imbalances caused. 
Articles 19-21 would oblige member states to implement smart metering, if a cost-benefit 
assessment defined by the European Commission were positive. Independent of the assessment, 
final customers would be entitled to have a smart meter installed at reasonable cost. 
Article 11 would entitle final customers to a dynamic price contract.22 
Articles 30-36 assign distribution system operators (DSOs) the role of neutral market 
facilitators for local ancillary services. DSOs would only be allowed to operate storage or EV 
recharging points if no other market option were available. Member states would need to enable 
non-discriminatory access to data from smart meters.  
                                                        
18 This would give a stronger price signal for market actors to counteract the system’s imbalance in real time. 
19 For negative prices, a limit can be set at €2000 per MWh. 
20 Based on Articles 41 and 54 of REGULATION (EU) 2015/1222. 
21 This limit is reduced over time and with increasing burden on the grid. 
22 Such a contract would allow customers to consume more flexibly based on changing prices throughout the 
day. See section 2.1.2. 
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4. PRIORITY AREAS 
his Task Force has identified a number of priority topics that have emerged during debates 
at meetings and general EU policy discussions, e.g. in the European Parliament and the 
European Council. They are grouped into market design issues, which in this report describe 
a number of fundamental points and various other topics, summarised under ‘other options’. 
4.1 Market design 
We focus here on three interrelated priority issues to unlock potential flexibility through proposed 
targeted reforms of electricity market design. These priorities were identified as being important 
controversial issues in the ongoing legislative process.  
The proposed reforms seek to enable new entrants to offer flexibility services and will 
capitalise on the benefits of market-widening through inter-zonal market integration. The first 
priority issue is that national market designs will be aligned to a highly efficient pan-European 
target model. This is a prerequisite for efficient cross-border market integration, i.e. the second 
priority issue that calls for efficient harmonised solutions for the determination of bidding zone 
areas and the allocation of available interconnection capacity. The third priority is to enable a 
regulatory environment for the aggregation of potential flexibility services by small market 
participants.  
4.1.1 Harmonising the design of short-term and real-time markets 
In many member states significant progress has been made to align the market design of day-ahead 
markets. Notably in the Nordic countries and member states in the Central Western Europe (CWE) 
electricity market area, day-ahead and intraday markets based on bilateral trading, as distinct from 
a mandatory power pool model in Spain, for example. Another example is the Flow-Based Market 
Coupling (FBMC) project in 2015 (see Box 4.1). Cross-border day-ahead trading proceeds through 
an implicit day-ahead allocation mechanism where market participants bid simultaneously for the 
energy and availability of interconnector capacity. When the interconnectors between two 
countries (price zones) are congested the congestion fee per MWh is equal to the price difference 
between the two zones, which is just large enough for all transactions to be accommodated by the 
available capacity. The algorithm used for the FBMC project ensures a much better use of available 
cross-border transmission capacity than before this project went live. Recently, also the intraday 
market design of many member states is, grosso modo, converging. A similar integration of intraday 
markets will increase flexibility and help the integration of electricity from intermittent renewable 
sources. This would be helped by the further harmonisation of intraday market design among 
member states (gate opening time, gate closure time close to delivery time; trading time units etc.), 
based on a revisited target model that takes into account possible benefits from auctions. Auctions 
(e.g. an opening and closing auction) may enhance market efficiency complementarily to 
continuous trading by offering additional market design elements (price discovery, cross-zonal 
capacity pricing, energy pricing options).23 
 
 
                                                        
23 Neuhoff et al. (2015); CE Delft and Microeconomix (2016). 
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Box 4.1 Successes of the day-ahead market 
Day-ahead markets are based on auctions around 12:00h the day before for delivery in unit trading 
periods (60 or 30 minutes) the following day. Intraday markets are still at a fledgling stage based on 
continuous trading, partly using the central trading platforms of power exchanges. The most liquid 
intraday markets are provided by EPEX Spot and Nord Pool Spot. On top of continuous trading, 
EPEX Spot organises day-ahead auctions on 15:00h for delivery in 96 distinct Programme Trading 
Units (PTUs of 15 minutes) the next day. The gate closure of EPEX Spot is 30 minutes before delivery 
time as against 20 minutes before delivery time for Nord Pool Spot. A successful integration project 
of national DA markets is the Flow-Based Market Coupling project, to date involving 17 out of 28 
member states, as well as Norway and Switzerland. This project allows for progress in the market 
efficiency of power markets in the cooperating countries, with significant improvements in the 
efficient use of interconnectors.  
 
The fully fledged integration of national balancing markets, however, is still a remote prospect.24 
The harmonisation of the currently widely fragmented national balancing markets is a very 
complex process. It may be time-consuming to reach a pan-European consensus on a detailed, 
highly efficient target model for balancing markets and operational balancing philosophies, and to 
subsequently implement them. Meanwhile, various regional initiatives exist on cross-border 
balancing cooperation. In the Nordic region TSOs cooperate in the realisation of a Common Merit 
Order List (CMOL) for balancing energy, whereas reserve capacities are acquired per individual 
control area. Dutch TSO TenneT BV and Swiss TSO Swissgrid participate in the German FCR joint 
tendering procedure for, respectively, 35MW and 25 MW of Dutch and Swiss FRR demand. The 
tender is open for German and prequalified Dutch and Swiss bidders. As from 1 August 2016 and 
early 2017, respectively, Belgium TSO Elia and French TSO RTE joined this cross-border activity as 
well.25 
Box 4.2 Introduction to the balancing market 
A balancing market encompasses the entirety of institutional, commercial and operational 
arrangements that establish a market-based management of balancing. TSOs are responsible for 
maintaining the system frequency within a predefined stability range (around 50 Hz in the 
synchronous area of Central Europe), balancing supply and demand in their respective control areas 
and ensuring resource adequacy in longer timeframes at the lowest cost for system users (generators 
and consumers).  Each TSO acts as a single buyer in his control area, buying specified balancing 
services (products) from balancing service providers (BSPs). BSPs are pre-qualified by the TSO on 
their ability to deliver specific balancing services. The balancing market consists of a market for 
balancing (reserve) capacity and a market for balancing energy.  BSPs offering balancing capacity 
bring out a bid for availability of a certain level (kW) of reserve capacity for an agreed duration in 
combination with a price bid for balancing energy upon activation by the TSO. To date, in most 
member states, BSPs contracted for delivery of balancing capacity are allowed to update their 
balancing energy bid. Moreover, in several member states non-contracted BSPs can submit balancing 
energy bids close to delivery time without receiving availability compensation.  
The size of the most flexible reserves, Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR) with full activation 
within 30 seconds, is determined by a UCTE (i.e. present-day ENTSO-E) agreement on a certain pro 
rata allocation of 3000 MW among the pertinent control areas of the synchronous area of Central 
Europe. The contracted FCR units will provide automatic positive (negative) balancing services when 
the frequency deviates negatively (positively) from the nominal value of 50 Hz in order to re-stabilise 
the frequency. In such a frequency deviation event the TSO will immediately activate contracted 
Frequency Restoration Reserve units, with a maximum full activation time of 15 minutes, to relieve 
the FCR units and to bring back the system frequency to its nominal value as well as to minimise the 
                                                        
24 See Box 4.2 for a brief introduction to the balancing market. 
25 TenneT (2017), “Market Review 2016”, Arnhem, March. 
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Area Control Error. Most FRR units are activated automatically by the TSO (FRRa), some are activated 
manually (FRRm) by the installation owned after a telephone call by the TSO. When necessary or 
financially more attractive, the least flexible reserves, i.e. the Replacement Reserves with an activation 
time up to several hours, will be activated to replace – if and when possible – the FCR units until the 
frequency has stabilised at its nominal setpoint and system balance has stabilised.  
Since the market liberalisation started in the 1990s, TSOs in each member state dealt with balancing 
consumption and generation and supply reliability in their respective control areas by introducing 
national balancing mechanisms with widely diverging features along a long list of design parameters. 
Only recently has attention been paid by organisations such as UCTE / ENTSO-E and ACER to 
developing guidelines and a network code for electricity balancing, aimed at converging national 
balancing arrangements to a cost-efficient, harmonised target model. Major efforts are needed to 
harmonise the designs of the national balancing markets to enable cross-border exchanges of 
balancing energy and joint procurement of balancing capacity. This, in turn, will bring high cost 
savings and improve supply security, including risk preparedness. 
 
Another example is the inter-TSO cooperation between the four German TSOs, building on the 
same design of balancing markets, which was stipulated by the German regulator. According to 
Consentec (2014), this cooperation encompasses i) the cost-optimised deployment of FRR and RR 
using common merit order lists; ii) a joint dimensioning procedure of the control reserve of  areas 
involved,26 iii) a joint tendering procedure, enabling partly or entirely common tendering of control 
reserve. This means that balancing reserves in a certain control area can be deployed by any one of 
the four TSOs, as long as technical restrictions are observed.  
National electricity markets were originally designed under circumstances different from 
today’s in terms of market actors, available generation and storage technologies, demand response, 
as well as different energy and climate objectives. Therefore, many market design elements must 
now be updated to the new circumstances. Such elements include the resolution of the trading time 
units, the minimum size of electricity products, the duration of availability periods and activation 
periods of balancing capacity products and the symmetry of balancing requirements. Progress 
would be to base reforms in national electricity market designs on a set of over-arching design 
principles, including the following three principles:  
1. Consistent configuration of sequential market segments. Day-ahead, intraday and real-time 
markets are best designed in a mutually consistent way, facilitating good market 
functioning27 (Smeers, 2008; van der Welle, 2016; CE Delft and Microeconomix, 2016)  
2. Inclusiveness: All market participants, large and small ones, and technologies can compete in 
all market segments on a non-discriminatory basis (including distributed resources and 
intermittent renewables) 
3. Appropriate price determination and timely price discovery. Timely discovery of prices of 
electricity products that closely reflect their real value including their inherent value of 
flexibility. 
The first principle follows from the observation that day-ahead, intraday and real-time are just 
different steps of a single trading process (Smeers, 2008). The trading process ends with delivery 
in real time based on transactions concluded before real time. After market participants have 
submitted to the TSO, their respective final (net power injection or withdrawal) positions, the TSO 
has to balance on a second-by second basis aggregate power injections and withdrawals in his 
control area28 and maintain the system frequency within a narrow stability range. Hence, the 
                                                        
26 This procedure enables portfolio effects to be taken into account, which reduces the demand for control 
reserve in case of forecast failures and enables the network integration of variable renewables at lower pan-
German costs.  
27 We focus on short-term timeframes, but the forward market will have to adapt to this principle as well. 
28 That is, the TSO must continually minimise his area control error. 
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balancing energy market is the residual real-time market with the most flexible, and therefore 
scarce and expensive, balancing energy providers on the supply side. At the same time, the 
balancing energy price tends to show the highest price volatility. Due to these reasons, the 
balancing energy market may provide the best flexibility-inclusive price signal to traders in 
preceding market segments (ID, DA). DA market participants (or their delegated balance 
responsible parties) have to submit schedules of their planned net injections or withdrawals to the 
TSO based on their day-ahead electricity transactions. In the intraday market, market participants 
have the chance to rebalance their portfolio close to real time their net injections/withdrawals in 
line with their final schedules. Market participants that have the possibility to operate in two or 
even three of these markets will seek to optimise their transactions through arbitraging.  
In the Clean Energy package, the European Commission proposes some important first steps 
to meet this requirement, e.g. the proposal to harmonise the programme time unit (PTU),29 to 15 
minutes across the EU. This duration is equal to the shortest PTU applied in the EU to date and 
dominates across member states in the CWE area. A shorter PTU helps TSOs and market 
participants to control the balancing process and their imbalance positions, particularly as 
generation and consumption become more volatile (steeper ramps, larger forecast errors etc.). 
Another important element would be to harmonise market time units in DA and ID markets in line 
with the proposed harmonisation of the PTU, i.e. to 15 minutes.30 A third element would be the 
harmonisation of the duration of all basic products in DA, ID and in real time, i.e. to 15 minutes in 
all market segments. 31  These reforms would remove entry hurdles for many technologies to 
become active in the balancing market.  
The possibility of multi-part bids was mentioned in the Task Force and continues to be play 
a role in debates on future market design. In combination with developed algorithms, such bids 
can take into account additional parameters like ramping rates and minimum load for clearing the 
market.32  
The second principle seeks a level-playing-field in electricity market design for all market 
players and technologies.  In fact, harmonising the duration of basic products in all electricity 
market segments to a relatively high-resolution (15 minutes) period is consistent with both the first 
and the second principle. Other applications of this principle include:  
 Reduced capacity size requirements as prequalification of market participants for the 
provision of balancing services.  
 Shorter lead times for reserve capacity auctions. From a grid operation perspective, long lead 
times increase the certainty to have sufficient capacity at hand to address very adverse 
security contingency scenarios. From a cost perspective, long lead times can be inefficient, 
because they tend to result in higher bids (due to opportunity cost considerations by the 
bidders) and can exclude certain market players.33 On the other hand, a cost-efficient reserve 
might include a portion of long-term contracts or a secondary market for hedging financial 
risks. Taking this into account, a large efficiency potential for reducing lead times likely 
remains.  
                                                        
29 Also referred to as imbalance settlement period. 
30 For example, a common PTU will reduce “schedule lags” during the morning and evening ramps starting 
out from a situation of hourly day-ahead trading and 15-minutes PTUs in BE markets. See L. Hirth and I. 
Ziegenhagen (2015), “Balancing Power and Variable Renewables: Three Links”, paper submitted to 
Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, Berlin, March. 
31 Some stakeholders do not see this as necessary. 
32 K. Neuhoff, N. Ritter, A. Salah Abou El-Enien and P. Vassilopoulos (2016), “Intraday Markets for Power: 
Discretizing the Continuous Trading?”, DIW Discussion paper No. 1544, Berlin. 
33 For these reasons, and due to pressure from energy regulators, a tendency towards shortening forward 
periods of reserve capacity auctions is noticable, e.g. in Germany and the Netherlands. 
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 Separate procurement of upward and downward balancing capacity would lower entry 
barriers e.g. for wind power. Currently existing requirements for symmetric capacity 
provision, which require participants to be capable of increasing and decreasing their output 
at any given time, cannot be complied with by renewable generators and can constitute an 
undue distortion. 
 Removing barriers to market-based aggregation services would enable e.g. participation of 
retail-level demand response 
 Balancing energy auctions open to prequalified market players outside the balancing 
capacity reserve 
Applications of the third principle relate to pricing, PTU regulation, availability of market 
information and intraday auctions.  
4.2 Price zone revision, capacity allocation and congestion rents 
Price zone revision 
The European Commission’s proposals include plans to adapt price zones to remove structural 
congestion in transmission grids. This includes an ad hoc revision of all price zones based on a 
defined procedure34 as well as continuous revisions in the future. The proposal could lead to a 
number of bidding zones being split, effectively increasing the number of zones.  
A nodal pricing system, i.e. a system with very high granularity of price zones, has been 
deemed the most efficient market model by a number of studies.35 One underlying reason is a high 
resolution of locational price signals which can lead to efficient dispatch and investment. In 
principle, better locational price signals can be facilitated not just by decreasing the size of bidding 
zones, but also by implementing dynamic grid charges. 
Increasing the number of bidding zones would affect many aspects of the electricity markets, 
including market efficiency, investment signals, distributional impacts (winners and losers), 
liquidity, issues of market power and costs of transitioning to the new structure.36 
Arguments for and against increasing the number of price zones (along structurally 
congested lines) include: 
Pros Cons 
 Better price signals for 
generation/consumption  
 Better price signals for investment in new 
capacity (including renewables and 
flexibility) 
 Lower cost for congestion management 
 Congestion rent as price signal for 
investment in grid capacity 
 Nodal pricing could be approached over 
time 
 Distributional effects would disrupt the 
market (creating winners and losers) 
 Continued changes of pricing zones will 
create additional investment uncertainty. 
 Lower market liquidity would increase 
risk for abuse of market power 
 (Lack of structural congestion in complex 
markets would limit relevance of the 
approach) 
 
                                                        
34 See Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation 
and congestion management. 
35 K. Neuhoff, B. Hobbs and D. Newbery (2014), “Congestion Management in European Power Networks - 
Criteria to Assess the Available Options”. 
36 Ofgem (2014), “Bidding Zones Literature Review”. 
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As ACER data has repeatedly shown, 37  costs arising from congestions within price zones, 
including those for redispatch/counter-trading as well as unplanned flows and loop flows are 
significant. They can be expected to rise further, as the impact of geographically changing feed-in 
of intermittent renewables further increases in the coming decades. As the short-term cost of 
changing price zones could potentially offset long-term benefits, case-by-case analyses of short-
term cost and long-term benefits might be required to assess the merits of changes in price zone 
make-up. At the same time, procedures and time-frame for the changes should take into account 
the needs of market participants. There is also a risk of market distortions resulting from liquidity 
issues and abuse of market power. 
Cross-border capacity allocation for the intraday and balancing markets 
To unlock the flexibility potential from market integration (see section 2.1.1), cross-border 
transmission capacity has to be made available in the intraday and balancing timeframes when 
efficient. As data collected by ACER shows,38 past legislation has improved the capacity allocation 
in the day-ahead timeframe, leaving intraday and balancing much more inefficient39.  
A mechanism for optimising the allocation of capacity across the different timeframes could 
address this. Such a mechanism would depend on a sufficiently harmonised market design (i.e. an 
applied target model) and its concrete features. One study40 suggests that capacity options should 
be applied in the day-ahead market in order to return unused capacity available to the intraday 
and balancing energy market. Similarly, a recalculation step for available capacity could be carried 
out before both timeframes. Another study suggests that in the mid-term, capacity allocation for 
balancing capacity and day-ahead market could be co-optimised in a single algorithm.41 
Facilitating optimal grid reinforcement  
Grid-reinforcement is the flexibility option least addressed in the European Commission’s 
proposal, with only one relevant provision. The draft report by the ITRE Committee suggests 
removing this provision, which would limit congestion rents obtained by TSOs to be used for new 
investments into the grid.  
Lack of market-based signals for investment into grid capacity is an important shortcoming 
in the economics of electricity grids. Internal congestions are compensated by redispatch and 
counter-trade (the cost for which are socialised) and system-beneficial investments are not 
appropriately incentivised.  
Congestion rent as well as cost of congestion management within bidding zones are 
indicators that imply a continuing potential for new transmission lines which are both optimal 
with regard to social welfare and serving the increasing flexibility needs. This applies for both 
bidding zone borders between and within member states. If price zones run along structurally 
congested lines (as proposed by the European Commission), price differentials between bidding 
zones generate a congestion rent, which is, in theory, a price signal for grid investment. However, 
congestion rent only measures the present level of congestion, while investment in new 
transmission capacity depends on long-term economic situations (10-15 years). A present 
congestion rent can be reduced much quicker (but less efficiently) by installing flexible generation 
on the good side of the congestion.  
                                                        
37 ACER/CEER (2016), “Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity Markets in 2015 
September 2016”. 
38 ACER (2016), “ACER Market Monitoring Report 2015 - KEY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS”. 
39 Efficiencies of day-ahead, intraday and balancing allocation is 84%, 54% and 10% respectively.  
40 A. van der Welle (2016), “Required adjustments of electricity market design for a more flexible energy 
system in the short term”. 
41 THEMA (2014), “Reservation of cross-zonal capacity for balancing services”. 
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Additionally, the main problem for grid investment is often not a question of finance, but of 
local acceptance for steel towers. Existing EU policies for grid reinforcement include (since 2009) 
planning by ENTSO-E42 as well as access to EU co-funding of interconnectors as “Projects of 
Common Interest”. As these measures are already being implemented, the “Clean Energy for All 
Europeans” package does not focus on reform of these approaches.  
4.2.1 Aggregation 
The European Commission proposal has given aggregation a prominent position, aiming to 
facilitate this future role as enabling decentralised flexibility and demand response. A number of 
stakeholders have criticised these provisions, arguing for a level playing field and against special 
privileges for aggregators.43 In the European Parliament’s report, amendments to the proposals 
modify rules for aggregation.44  
The controversy revolves around compensation to be paid by aggregators to electricity 
suppliers and the negative implications of aggregating demand from customers without informing 
their suppliers. On the one hand, independent aggregators can unduly benefit from (indirectly) 
selling energy procured by the supplier. On the other, influencing customers’ consumption 
behaviour often leads to unforeseen imbalance costs for suppliers, due to a different load curve 
from the one used by the supplier for sourcing its electricity. 
Compensation for sourcing energy 
When aggregators act as sellers in the wholesale or balancing market, the energy sold is indirectly 
sourced from suppliers’ energy meant to be delivered to consumers. As consumers neither 
consume nor pay for this energy based on the retail price, suppliers are not remunerated for it. 
Instead, the aggregators receive remuneration for the same energy from the wholesale or balancing 
market. Since they sell energy they have not procured, aggregators should pay compensation for 
the energy concerned and assume balancing responsibility. Otherwise, they would benefit from an 
indirect subsidy, since the cost of procuring energy would be socialised among all customers of the 
supplier, risking negative social welfare effects.   
In France, there is a rule for payments from aggregators to suppliers for the energy resold. 
This rule has been upheld in court after being challenged by aggregators. France’s aggregation 
market has now developed mainly for larger consumers (which can aggregate higher volumes at 
similar cost) and less for smaller consumers (like households). Given the decreasing cost for the 
needed ICT and improvements in standardisation, market penetration is increasingly likely to 
reach smaller customers. 
Removing barriers for aggregation 
In many European markets, including day-ahead, intraday (plus other wholesale segments) and 
balancing markets, there are still considerable barriers for aggregation. Regulatory arrangements 
to facilitate participation in all market segments currently only exist in France.45 An initial priority 
would therefore be to adopt such arrangements to enable participation of aggregation, based on 
the principle of non-discrimination, in all wholesale and balancing market segments.  
                                                        
42 ENTSO-E’s Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) assesses transmission grid expansion needs for 
reaching EU policy objectives based on cost-benefit analysis. According to the TYNDP 2016, currently 
planned transmission grid reinforcement would cost 1-2€/MWh (as a surcharge on each MWh of electricity 
consumed in the EU) while reducing wholesale prices by 1-5€/MWh. 
43 H. Ziegler, T. Mennel and C. Hülsen (2017), “Demand Response Activation by Independent Aggregators 
As Proposed in the Draft Electricity Directive”.  
44 See Amendment 17&18 of European Parliament Draft Report 2016/0380(COD).  
45 CE Delft and Microeconomix (2016), “Refining ShortTerm Electricity Markets to Enhance Flexibility”, study 
on behalf of Agora Energiewende. 
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The state-aid guidelines provide rules for the treatment of demand response in relation to 
capacity remuneration mechanisms and take the role of ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of 
aggregation (as a form of demand response). 
Independent Aggregators  
Aggregation is a service that pools demand response load and directly trades in the energy market 
on behalf of retail customers. This service enables retail customers to overcome barriers to entering 
the wholesale and balancing markets. Aggregation can be carried out both by independent 
aggregators, as well as by retail suppliers (which may themselves procure their energy in the 
wholesale market and/or produce their own electricity). Based on a level playing field, 
independent aggregation and aggregation by suppliers should both be possible. 
Balancing Compensation 
That all market participants should bear a financial responsibility for adhering to their scheduled 
generation and consumption is uncontroversial. When aggregators are market participants (both 
in wholesale markets, balancing markets or ancillary services), they should bear this financial 
responsibility, i.e. to face imbalance charges if ex post analysis shows that there was a deviation 
from the aggregator’s submitted schedule in a given time interval. 
A different issue is compensation from aggregators to suppliers when the latter face 
imbalances that were caused by the aggregator. Since aggregators incentivise contracted 
consumers to change their consumption behaviour, suppliers will likely face increasingly uncertain 
load curves and therefore increasing imbalance costs. The European Commission’s proposal grants 
member states the option to enforce compensation from aggregators to suppliers in this case.  
4.3 Other Options 
4.3.1 Priority dispatch and curtailing 
Support schemes and other policies benefiting renewable energy sources are currently justified by 
the decarbonisation policy objective. Ideally, they would also be designed to minimise market 
distortions and provide maximum incentive to efficiently integrate into the electricity system. 
Inversely, changes to the market design should facilitate integration of renewables into the market. 
Currently, renewable generation (and high-efficiency cogeneration) is subject to priority 
dispatch, i.e. these sources are curtailed last and only if their output is a threat to the system’s 
stability and cannot be compensated otherwise. The European Commission’s proposed new 
Electricity Market Regulation limits priority dispatch to existing as well as small new installations 
(see section 2.2). The proposal includes new rules that call for market-based curtailment (to be the 
new non-discriminatory norm for curtailment procedures). It specifies that in emergency 
deviations from this rule, cogeneration and renewables are meant to be curtailed last. Moreover, 
in such cases all plants would be compensated. 
The priority access rule, which gives renewables the benefit of being the last technology 
curtailed, can lead to a higher system cost, since renewables are often the most efficient curtailment 
option. However, given the long-term perspective of a growing share of renewables feeding into 
the grid, provisions are needed that incentivise system operators to accommodate these 
renewables. In the absence of other policies, eliminating priority access may lead to the increasing 
curtailment of renewables. Moreover, other market participants (including inflexible ‘must-run’) 
capacities would lack the pressure to optimise their flexibility potential.  
Removing the priority access benefit for renewables might hamper the evolution of the 
electricity system, at least in the absence of other policies incentivising system operators to 
integrate higher shares of renewables.  
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WindEurope argues that the removal of priority dispatch for new installations should be 
accompanied by provisions to ensure that renewables have access to all market segments 
(including balancing and congestion management). Moreover, WindEurope favours the inclusion 
of feed-in premiums or certificates in downward balancing energy prices (opportunity cost 
considerations). One important underlying reason is that the renewables’ support scheme-based 
remuneration is tied to the actual output of the plants. Thus, deliberate non-generation would 
result in reduced revenue. However, with the evolution of support scheme design,46 participating 
in negative balancing should become increasingly feasible for renewable installations. 
In some member states, wind generators already participate in balancing markets as 
downward regulation47 and there is at least one case of upward regulation (in Spain).48 In most 
markets progress is still needed. Indeed, separate markets for upward and downward balancing 
lead to lower entry hurdles for variable renewables. 
In any case, curtailment, redispatch and other decisions taken by the TSO in real time should 
be subject to increased transparency. This would give market participants better information on 
what to expect in certain situations and incentivise TSOs to act responsibly. 
4.3.2 Role of DSOs 
By far most of the new renewables-based generation capacity is and will continue to be connected 
to the distribution grid. In some member states more than 90% of electricity produced by wind and 
solar is integrated at Distribution System Operators (DSOs) level. Flexibility (e.g. by demand 
response, electricity storage and decentralised generation) provided at the DSO level to both the 
DSO and TSO level adds to this challenge, particularly when aggregated.  
To date, TSOs have carried the main responsibility for keeping the electricity system in 
balance. DSOs, on the other hand, have largely focused on maintaining and operating the 
distribution grid, as well as collecting metering data from the consumer side.  
The changes outlined above are likely to require new roles and responsibilities for DSOs. It 
is likely that additional data on consumption patterns and electricity prices have to be interchanged 
between the DSOs, TSOs and the wholesale/retail market agents. For example, in the case of 
aggregation, the actual feed-in or consumption impact from the aggregators’ actions has to be 
calculated, by comparing the load curves of their customers to a hypothetical reference curve. EU-
level rules should ensure a level playing-field for aggregators. Member state-level rules for the 
calculation of aggregators’ net generation/consumption balance should be monitored by ACER. 
In addition, DSOs need data access to the actions of aggregators to actively and securely manage 
their system operation.   
While aggregation of customers at the DSO level constitutes a substantial flexibility source, 
it increases complexity of grid operation. Sudden changes of load might cause new problems in 
the distribution grid, as might flows intended for the TSO level balancing. Operation without pre-
notice may cause unexpected congestion at different levels of the grid.  
Better cooperation between TSOs and DSOs would increase operational security and system-
wide cost-efficiency. This should include communication standards, coordinated 
calculation/operation of grid capacities, a shared pool of flexibility reserves and network planning. 
Another issue is the technical need for sufficient grid resilience and flexible resources 
accessible to DSOs in order to fulfil their role as neutral market facilitators. Generally, DSOs and 
TSOs should only own or operate assets that are needed for secure system operation to ensure their 
independence from the market.  
                                                        
46 In Denmark, support is granted for a certain number of full load hours, so that generators are incentivised 
to provide flexibility in the market. 
47 WindEurope (2016), “WindEurope views on curtailment of wind power and its link to priority dispatch”. 
48See https://www.acciona.com/news/acciona-energia-pioneer-providing-electric-power-system-
adjustment-only-using-wind-power/. 
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Lastly, variable tariffs could be a tool to avoid inefficient investment in hardware and to 
ensure that network costs are covered.  
4.3.3 Sectoral integration 
The market is developing stronger links between the heating/cooling, electricity and transport 
sectors and the different energy carriers used therein (gas/liquid fuel, heat, electricity). This 
sectoral integration has potential benefits for flexibility, decarbonisation and security of supply, 
but also challenges. 
An open question is about the roles of governments, which may be inclined to pursue specific 
options. This risks creating market distortions. That the market framework should be developed 
in such a way that consumers will be able to optimise their use of different energy sources is 
undisputed. 
Sectoral integration offers flexibility by allowing the optimal use of various energy carriers 
and infrastructures. It can also provide storage solutions for heating and cooling, both in the short 
term and seasonally, which is a challenge arising from increasing electrification. Solutions exist in 
power-to-X technologies, e.g. power-to-gas and power-to-heat (see Annex 1).  
Power-to-gas refers to a group of technologies aimed at converting electricity to hydrogen 
and/or carbon-based fuels. The process of electrolysis consumes power to generate hydrogen from 
water. This hydrogen can then be stored, used in direct hydrogen applications (for industrial 
production or energetic conversion, e.g. in fuel cells) or used to synthesise substitute natural gas 
and transport fuel. 
Since heat can be stored and used at a different point in time (with losses), electric heating 
can be operated flexibly if a thermal storage tank is available. Technologies include conventional 
electric heaters and heat pumps, as well as hybrid heat pumps. The same concept holds true for 
electric cooling.  
Electric heating and cooling is widely applied in households, businesses and industrial 
processes. While some companies already provide balancing services to the grid (see demand 
response section), a large potential on the business and household scale could be unlocked by 
making electric heating and cooling installations more flexible and by providing access to a market 
platform or aggregation.  
Electrification 
Increasing electrification of the heating sectors faces the challenge of seasonal storage for heating. 
The heating sector currently relies on natural gas as a medium that is stored seasonally. PV and 
wind power would not be able to provide the same amount of supply security in winter months, 
particularly in cold winters. Unless accounted for, this is a potential crisis factor.   
Box 4.3 Electrification 
Energy is consumed in three end-use sectors: buildings (for heating and cooling), transport and 
industry. Increasing generation of solar and wind power will lead to excess electricity when the sun 
is shining and the wind is blowing. At these points in time, electricity will be inexpensive on 
wholesale markets and therefore increasingly used to generate heat in buildings and industry. 
Electricity in transport is another important avenue. Electricity is already used largely in trains and 
trams, but is likely increase to electric bicycles, motor cycles and cars. As more consumers use electric 
vehicles, the need for smart charging adapted to wholesale power prices and the provision of vehicle-
to-grid (V2G) flexibility will grow.  
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ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF FLEXIBLE GENERATION, 
CONSUMPTION AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES 
A.1 Flexible generation 
Parameters characterising a generation technology’s level of flexibility include: 
 Minimum load (the lowest percentage of nominal output to which a plant’s production can 
be reduced and operated economically) 
 Ramp rate (the speed with which a plant can increase or decrease its production) 
 Start-up time (the time needed for a plant to change from idle state to production; differs 
between hot and cold idle state) 
For each technology, these parameters exist in different ranges and can depend on the specific case 
of each installation. Production units can be specifically engineered and operated with higher 
flexibility, which however increases investment and/or production cost. Existing plants can be 
retrofitted for improved flexibility. 
Thermal power plants 
Thermal power plants, including electricity generation from natural gas, hard coal, lignite, biomass 
and nuclear, are able to provide flexibility to varying degrees.49 The table below shows typical 
parameters for different technologies.50 
 
Natural gas-fired plants, which exist based on gas turbines and combustion engines, are the most 
flexible. Open-cycle gas turbines (OCGT) and engines are more flexible than combined-cycle plants, 
while the latter are more efficient.  
Biogas plants have similar flexibility to natural gas plants, but are typically smaller and more 
decentralised.51  
CCGT, hard coal and lignite plants have considerable flexibility potentials to be gained by 
state-of-the-art technologies (see table above). A drawback can be increased strain on components, 
increasing the lifetime of components and thus the cost of operation.52  
                                                        
49 Renewable thermal power plant technologies separately discussed. 
50 Source: EUGINE and Agora Energiewende (2017), “Flexibility in thermal power plants – With a focus on 
existing coal-fired power plants”. 
51 The aggregator Next Kraftwerke facilitates participation of biogas plants in the German balancing market. 
52 Agora Energiewende (2017), “Flexibility in thermal power plants – With a focus on existing coal-fired 
power plants”. 
OCGT CCGT Hard coal Lignite
Engine power 
plants
Minimum load  40–50%  40–50%  25–40%  50–60% Close to zero
Average ramp rate (per minute)  8–12%  2–4%  1.5–4%  1–2% 20% - 50%
Start-up time  5–11 min  60 min - 4 h  2.5–10 h  4–10 h 2-5 min
Minimum load  20–50%  20–40%  25–40%  35–50% Close to zero
Average ramp rate (per minute)  10–15%  4–8%  3–6%  2–6h% 50%
Start-up time  5–10 min  30 min - 3h  80 min - 6 h  1.25 – 8 h 2 min
Commonly 
used
State of the 
art
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Nuclear power capacities have been shown to possess a technical flexibility potential in 
France.53 The ramping rate is comparable to coal-fired power plants, while the start-up time can be 
up to 2 days (compared to 3-6 hours for coal plants).54  
Renewable thermal power plant technologies, i.e. geothermal and solar thermal electricity 
generation can be operated flexibly. A number of existing solar thermal plants operate heat storage, 
which enables generation during night time. 
The large number of existing thermal power plants across the EU and the option to retrofit 
hold a very large flexibility potential. While hard coal and lignite plants are under pressure due to 
decarbonisation policies, they may be a viable flexibility option for the mid-term. Absolute 
emissions could be reduced due to lower production time being necessary for flexible operation. 
Hydro power 
Hydro power is divided into three technology categories: run-of-river plants, reservoir plants and 
pumped-storage plants. Each possesses different flexibility characteristics. Importantly, pumped 
storage can provide both flexible generation and consumption. Reservoir hydropower is restricted 
to generation flexibility. Run-of-river plants hydropower can only provide limited short-term 
flexibility. 
According to an IEA report,55 only 47% of the technical hydro potential in Europe is currently 
used, suggesting considerable unused potential. However, the economically feasible potential can 
be considered to be significantly lower. The report expects 61GW of new capacity by 2050. 
Start-up time and ramping rates are normally lower for hydro power than for gas turbines,56 
but can be subject to environmental restrictions.  
The availability of flexibility from hydro plants is limited by their availability of water, which 
depends on the size of reservoirs, amount of water inflow (daily, monthly, seasonally varied) and 
reserved safety margins. Many units need to be operated cooperatively with other stations in the 
same river system.  
 
Type Characteristics 
Run-of-river Hydro Power  Little or no storage capacity 
 The generation profile depends on the available water flow 
 Some short-term flexibility possible 
Pumped-Storage Hydro Power  Water is cycled between a lower and upper reservoir. 
 Electricity storage, acts like a battery  
 70-80% roundtrip efficiency57  
Reservoir Hydro Power  A dam is used to store water in a reservoir 
 Can generate flexibly within technical and regulatory limits 
 Can provide seasonal flexibility 
                                                        
53 Within one week the total nuclear output has been observed to vary by up to 17GW (27% of 63GW installed 
capacity). 
54 Fraunhofer IWES (2015): “The European Power System in 2030: Flexibility Challenges and Integration 
Benefits. An Analysis with a Focus on the Pentalateral Energy Forum Region. Analysis on behalf of Agora 
Energiewende”. 
55 IEA (2012), “Technology Roadmap Hydropower”. 
56  Ramping rates can be 40% of nominal output per minute (VGB/EURELECTRIC study on technical 
flexibility of power plants (Eurelectric: Hydro in Europe, Powering Renewables, 2011). 
57 IEA Hydropower Technology Roadmap: Hydropower. 
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A.2 Flexible consumption/energy storage 
Any given imbalance in the electricity system can be balanced not only by adapting generation 
flexibly, but also by adapting consumption. Traditional flexible consumption resources used today 
include pumped-hydro storage and disruptible loads in the industry (see section 2.2.3).  
In principle, flexible consumption can be enabled implicitly, i.e. through dynamic pricing, or 
explicitly, i.e. by participation in the balancing market either directly or enabled by aggregation. 
Power-to-gas 
Power-to-gas refers to a group of technologies aimed at converting electricity to hydrogen and/or 
carbon-based fuels. The process of electrolysis consumes power to generate hydrogen from water. 
This hydrogen can then be stored, used in direct hydrogen applications (e.g. for industrial 
production or in transport) or used to synthesise substitute natural gas and transport fuel.  
While electrolysis is used around the world to produce hydrogen, the application as a 
provider of flexibility in the grid is still at an earlier stage.58 A key requirement for this purpose is 
to adapt systems from the traditional continuous operation to dynamic start-up and ramping 
behaviour. According to a study from 2014, a number of manufacturers have solutions at hand for 
dynamic system design with ramp rates of up to 100% per second in their labs. However, effects of 
fast ramping regimes on system lifetime are not yet well documented.59 
Since electrolysers can achieve higher efficiency when operating at part load, one operation 
strategy is to operate at part load and to offer both positive and negative balancing services to the 
grid. Bertruccioli et al. (2014) suggest that such a strategy might become increasingly viable.  
Depending on the subtechnologies applied, the conversion efficiency for electrolysers is 60-
80%.60 Converting the hydrogen to substitute natural gas or liquid fuel reduces the efficiency to 
55% (not accounting for usable heat).61 
Power-to-heat/cold 
Since heat can be stored and used at a different point in time (with losses), electric heating can be 
operated flexibly if a thermal storage tank is available. Technologies include conventional electric 
heaters and heat pumps. The same concept holds true for electric cooling. While some industrial 
players already provide balancing services to the grid (see demand response section), a large 
potential on the business and household scale could be unlocked by providing access to a market 
platform or aggregation (see section 2.1.3).  
Hybrid heat pumps for households, e.g. devices which include both a gas-fired (condensing) 
boiler and an electric heat pump, are a promising technology which is increasing in sales. They 
enable higher flexibility of households by (smart) arbitrage between electricity and gas prices. More 
households switching to electric heating and cooling is an example of sectoral integration. 
                                                        
58 Uniper is operating two pilot plants in Hamburg and Falkenhagen, Germany. The latter injects hydrogen 
into the high-pressure network operated by ONTRAS Gastransport and will be enhanced by a methanation 
plant producing synthetic natural gas in 2018. 
59 L. Bertuccioli, A. Chan, D. Hart, F. Lehner, B. Madden and E. Standen (2014), “Study on development of 
water electrolysis in the EU”. 
60 T. Smolinka et al. (2011), “Stand und Entwicklungspotenzial der Wasserelektrolyse zur Herstellung von 
Wasserstoff aus regenerativen Energien”. 
61 M. Götz et al. (2015), “Renewable Power-to-Gas: A technological and economic review”. 
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A.3 Electricity storage 
Electricity storage can both consume and generate electricity flexibly. Next to pumped-hydro 
storage (see section 2.1.1), which is the storage technology most widely deployed by far, other 
technologies are emerging. 
According to an IEA report,62 out of 3.4GW non-hydro storage capacities deployed in 2016, 
53% were battery solutions, with lithium ion batteries contributing much more than other battery 
technologies (lead acid, redox-flow, nickel-cadmium, sodium-sulphur). Flywheels and compressed 
air energy storage (CAES) contributed 28% and 19% respectively. The majority of projects were 
launched or coordinated by grid operators either to meet specific ancillary services needs or as 
demonstration plants, i.e. not based on price signals in wholesale markets. 
Batteries 
Most battery systems can be switched on (to full load) within milliseconds, which renders them 
highly flexible.63 Installed global capacity of grid-connected batteries has increased by 700% since 
2006, with a 50% capacity increase in 2016.64 A variety of battery technologies is applied, with 
lithium-ion batteries currently seeing the bulk of capacity additions.  
Lithium-ion batteries achieve the highest cycle efficiency of 75-97%. Other technologies 
range between 60 and 90%.  
Their scalability makes batteries well suited to a large array of applications and locations in 
the energy system, including kW65 and MW66 scales. They can be used for self-consumption or 
coordinated with generation technologies and the grid e.g. by aggregation.  
Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) 
CAES has been demonstrated to be a viable concept and several new (subsidised) plants are 
planned in the United States and Europe.67 The technology can utilise salt caverns to consume 
electricity by storing compressed air. This air can afterwards be used for electricity generation 
through air turbines or in combination with gas turbines. Start-up time is typically 7-10 minutes 
and ramping rates are 20% per minute (compression) and 100% per minute (decompression).68 
While plants currently in operation have efficiencies below 45%69, technological developments 
could push to exceed 70%.70 
                                                        
62 International Energy Agency (2017), “Tracking Clean Energy Progress: 2017”. 
63 X. Luo, J. Wang, M. Dooner and J. Clarke (2015), “Overview of current development in electrical energy 
storage technologies and the application potential in power system operation”. 
64 REN21, (2017), ”2017 Global Status Report”, Paris: REN21 Secretariat. 
65 The Tesla power wall is a well-known household scale product meant to enable self-consumption by 
prosumers. 
66 A 10MW lithium ion battery plant in Feldheim, Germany, provides ancillary services to TSO 50 Hertz. The 
project was co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund. 
67 The EU is co-funding a CAES plant in Larde, Northern Ireland as a Project of Common Interest (PCI). 
68 J. Apt and P. Jaramillo (2014), “Variable Renewable Energy and the Electricity Grid”. 
69 Two plants in Huntdorf, Germany (290 MW) and McIntosh, Alabama, US (110 MW). 
70 B. Elmegaard and W. Brix (2011), “Efficiency of Compressed Air Energy Storage”. 
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ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND 
TECHNICAL TERMS 
ACE 
Area control error. Deviation from scheduled net import or export of the 
control area concerned. 
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
Aggregator 
A legal entity that aggregates the load or generation of various demand 
and/or generation units for sale or auction in organised energy and 
balancing markets 
Ancillary service 
All service necessary for the operation of transmission system and 
distribution networks 
ATC Available Transfer Capacity 
Balancing Capacity 
A volume of reserve capacity that a balancing service provider has 
agreed to hold and in respect of which the balancing service provider  
has agreed to submit bids for the corresponding volume of balancing 
energy to the TSO for the duration of the contract  
Balancing market 
Balancing market means the entirety of institutional, commercial and 
operational arrangements that establish market-based management of 
the function of balancing within the framework of European network 
codes 
Balancing portfolio 
Grouping of network user’s inputs and off-takes in a portfolio. The 
imbalances of the portfolio will be billed to the balance responsible party 
BRP 
Balance responsible party. A market entity or its chosen representative 
responsibility for its imbalances.  
BSP 
Balancing service provider, i.e. a market participant with reserve-
providing units or reserve-providing groups able to provide balancing 
services to the TSO  
CMOL 
Common merit order list: a list of balancing energy bids sorted in order 
of their bid prices, used for the activation of balancing energy bids with 
a coordinated balancing area  
Congestion management  
Set of actions that a network operator performs to avoid or relieve a 
deviation of the electrical parameters from the limits that define the 
secure operation, including voltage control 
Coordinated balancing 
area 
A region in which TSOs are exchanging balancing capacity, sharing 
reserves, exchanging balancing energy and operating the imbalance 
netting process 
Countertrade 
A market-based transaction initiated by TSOs between two 
neighbouring control or price areas, or within a TSO control area in the 
opposite direction of the main power flow, in order to allow for a higher 
amount of commercial 
Transactions in the mainly traded direction. By countertrading, the TSO 
ensures that physical flows of the network are within acceptable limits. 
Countertrade may be considered either a preventive or curative 
measure.  
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CSP 
Curtailment Service Provider. A participant in the market for balancing 
reserves who enters into contract with willing retail customers to reduce 
electricity usage for a limited period of time per annum when required 
by the CSP in exchange for a financial reward. Through aggregation the 
CSP is able to meet capacity performance requirements when making 
bids in certain reserve auctions (e.g. in the PJM market). 
Curtailment 
Reduction of the electricity flow at the connection of a network user 
(generator, end user) with the grid  
DA Day Ahead 
Demand Response 
Voluntary changes in electric usage end-use customers make from their 
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of 
electricity or system conditions  
DSO Distribution system operator 
FBMC Flow Based Market Coupling 
FCR 
Frequency containment reserves, also called primary control reserves. 
Operating reserves with typically an activation time of 30 seconds, used 
for constant containment of frequency deviations from the set point, 50 
Hz in continental Europe, in order to constantly maintain the power 
balance in the whole synchronously interconnected transmission 
system. Activations of these reserves results in a restored power balance 
at a frequency deviating from nominal value. Usually activated 
automatically by locally measured frequency deviation.  
Flexibility 
The ability of an electricity system to adapt to rapid  and large 
fluctuations of supply and demand and to efficiently deploy resources 
for congestion management 
Forecast error 
The difference between forecast feed-in from an intermittent renewable 
generating installation and actual, real-time feed-in. Forecast errors 
become less on average, the closer forecasts are submitted ahead of real-
time.    
FRR 
Frequency restoration reserves, also called secondary control reserves. 
Operating reserves with typically an activation time up to 15 minutes 
used to restore frequency to the set point value and to re-balance the 
balancing area concerned to the forecast value after a sudden system 
imbalance. Usually activated by IT signal (sometimes manually) and 
centrally (by the TSO concerned).  
ID Intraday 
Imbalance 
The difference between the actual net in-feed and the final schedule 
(programme) of net in-feed submitted by a balance responsible party for 
a programme time unit. Note that in this context a given positive net off-
take volume is equated to the same volume of negative in-feed.  
Imbalance settlement 
A financial settlement mechanism aiming at charging or paying balance 
responsible parties for their imbalances 
Imbalance settlement 
period (ISP) 
See: Programme time Unit  
Imbalance price 
The price at which the imbalance (negative and positive balance 
separately or, alternatively, net balance) volume is settled. In some 
member states single pricing is applied where short and long positions 
are settled at identical prices, whereas in other member states dual 
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pricing is applied settling short and long positions at different prices 
either for all PTUs or, alternatively, only for those PTUs in which the 
TSO has regulated both in upward and in downward direction.  
Integrated scheduling 
process 
An iterative process that uses at least integrated scheduling process bids 
(multi-part bids) which contain commercial data, complex technical 
data of each power generating facilities or demand facilities which 
explicitly includes the start-up characteristics, the latest control area 
adequacy analysis, and the operational security limits as input to the 
process. Used for dispatch and balancing energy activation optimisation 
with due allowance for operational security 
Load profile 
The estimated variation of load versus time. A load profile will vary 
according to customer type and/or temperatures, and/or 
weekdays/public holidays. Load profiles are used to convert the 
monthly/yearly metered consumption data into estimates of 
daily/hourly or quarter hourly consumption  
Loop flows 
Unscheduled cross-border flows resulting from internal exchanges. 
(ACER/CEER, 2016: 21). Typically, because of critical branches in the 
national grid, part of the paths of least resistance crosses national 
borders in an unscheduled fashion.  
Market time unit 
Trading period of a certain electricity market segment (forward, day-
ahead, intraday). 
Multi-part bids 
A multi-part bid consists on top a bid for energy separate prices for costs 
such as start-up costs, no-load costs and information from the bidder on 
technical constraints and capabilities such as minimum load 
requirements and ramp rates 
NEMO Nominated electricity market operator 
Network codes 
Codes that encompass the technical rulebook of the European energy 
sector. They are secondary legislation addressing technical issues, 
binding in all member states. They can be subdivided into market codes, 
connection codes and operational codes (based on an ENTSO-E 
brochure on network codes)  
NTC Net Transfer Capacity 
OTC Over-the-counter: bilateral trade typically at non-disclosed terms 
Overcapacity 
A situation where the difference between observed reliability margins 
and the reliability standards defined for a given system is above a 
certain threshold during a period of time.  
Peak shifting/shaving The flattening of an electricity consumption load curve 
Prosumer A consumer who produces electricity. 
PTU 
Programme time unit: the standard period for which the net feed-in 
schedules needs to be specified by balance responsible parties and over 
which the costs of the measured total imbalance (negative and positive 
balance separately or, alternatively, net balance) volume are settled. 
Also called ISP (imbalance settlement period).  
Redispatch 
A measure where TSOs (jointly on both sides of the congestion or 
unilateral) change generation (or load) patterns in their grid in order to 
change physical flows in order to solve a congestion situation. Often 
used only as a curative measure after day-ahead market gate closure. 
Generators and consumption units are directly involved in cases of 
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redispatch if a TSO orders them to adjust their generation capacity when 
a trade transaction leads ultimately to a change in generation. 
Consequently, generators or operators of large consumption units 
might face higher costs (e.g. reflected in bids submitted in the balancing 
market) for these changes as they might result in an economically sub-
optimal dispatch situation from their point of view. In addition, 
redispatch implies that TSOs have a clear basis for ordering generators 
to adjust their generation capacity. This basis can be contractual or even 
derive from legal provisions. Moreover, TSOs require proper 
information on planned generation and actual generation of plants 
potentially involved in such redispatch actions.  
Reserve margins 
Any generating capacity that is available to cover the load in a given 
point in time.  
RR 
Replacement reserves, also called tertiary control reserves. Operating 
reserves with an activation time from 15 minutes up to hours, used to 
replace FRR over time and to restore the required level of operating 
reserves to be prepared for further system imbalance. Activation is a 
decision taken by TSO staff based on current and expected deployment 
of FRR. Activation is done manually or sometimes by IT signal  
RTO 
Regional Transmission Organisation. Coordinates the transmission of 
wholesale electricity in the region concerned. For example: PJM in the 
US. 
Self-consumption 
Consumption of power generated at the premises of a consumer, either 
consuming this power instantaneously after self-generation or after 
having stored self-generated power in a storage device at the 
aforementioned premises    
Self-generation Power generation at the premises of a consumer 
Scarcity 
Situations whereby the actual “reserve margins” are close to zero. 
Although scarcity only arises in real time, scarcity situations are likely 
to be anticipated by market participants in the form of high-price 
periods in the different market timeframes   
Standard product 
A harmonised electricity trading or balancing market product, 
facilitating cross-border exchanges  
System balancing 
All actions and processes, on all timelines, through which TSOs seek to 
ensure, in a continuous way, to maintain the system frequency within a 
predefined stability and to comply with the amount of reserves needed 
per frequency containment process, frequency restoration process and 
reserve replacement process  
TSO Transmission system operator 
UAF 
Unscheduled (cross-border) allocated flow, resulting from non-
coordinated capacity allocation  
Unscheduled flows Loop flows and UAFs  
Voltage control 
A distribution system control managed by distribution system 
operators in order to maintain voltage in their networks within limits 
and to minimise the reactive power flows and consequently, technical 
losses and to maximise available active power flow 
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